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IN LOCO PARENTIS IN NATIONAL SERVICE
LIFE INSURANCE
During World War II the United States Government, under-
taking to provide life insurance coverage at reasonable rates for
members of its armed forces,1 enacted the National Service Life
Insurance Act of 1940.2 One important feature of the Act was the
restriction upon the class of persons who might be designated as
beneficiary.' This condition gave rise to the problem of what con-
stitutes the relationship of loco parentis4 as the insured was allowed
to designate a "parent," which includes a person in loco parentis ;5
and, in the absence of designation of a beneficiary or upon the
death of the one named, the proceeds were payable in a prescribed
manner which included payments to "parents" if there were no
living widow, widower, or children of the insured.8
I. STATUTORY CHANGES IN POLICY COVERAGE
Restrictions upon the class of designated beneficiaries were
removed by a 1946 amendment as to insurance policies maturing
7
after August 1, 1946," thus eliminating the probletii of loco parentis
1. See Dyer, National Service Life Insurance for World War II
Veterans, 7 Texas B. J. 71, 92 (1944) ; Thompson, National Service "Life
Insurance" and the Prc-War Life Insurance of Persons ins the Armed
Forces, 23 Mich. B. J. 65 (1944) ; Notes, 26 Iowa L. Rev. 853 (1941), 21
Notre Dame Law. 45 (1945).
2. 54 Stat. 1008 ct seq. (1940), as amended, 38 U. S. C. § 801 et seq.
(1946), 38 U. S. C. § 802 ct seq. (Supp. 1951). Somewhat comparable
coverage had been provided by War Risk Insurance of World War I. 38
Stat. 711 (1914), as amended, 38 U. S. C. § 421 (1946).
3. Occupying a somewhat analogous situation are fraternal benefit asso-
ciations which sometimes limit the beneficiaries which their members may
name. Cases involving these limitations might possibly aid in the solution of
difficult loco parentis problems in National Service Life Insurance cases.
Vance, Insurance 707 (3d ed., Anderson, 1951) ; Minn. Stat. § 64.06 (1949).
4. See 27 B. U. L. Rev. 338 (1947).
5. Section 601 (g) of the original act, 54 Stat. 1010 (1940), provided:
"The insurance shall be payable only to a widow, widower, child (including
a stepchild or an illegitimate child if designated as beneficiary by the in-
sured), parent (including person in loco parentis if designated as beneficiary
by the insured), brother or sister of the insured. The insured shall have the
right to designate the beneficiary or beneficiaries of the insurance, but only
within the classes herein provided, and shall, subject to regulations, at all
times have the right to change the beneficiary or beneficiaries of such in-
surance without the consent of such beneficiary or beneficiaries but only
within the classes herein provided."
6. 54 Stat. 1010 (1940), 38 U. S. C. § 802(h) (1946).
7. "'Maturing of the insurance" refers to the date when payment under
the policy becomes due, the death of the insured. Kimbrough and Glen,
American Law of Veterans 93 (Supp. 1951).
8. 60 Stat. 782, 38 U. S. C. § 802(g) (1946), Burton v. United States,
95 F. Supp. 474 (WV.D. La. 1951), Tannehill v. United States, 82 F. Supp.
362 (N.D. Ala. 1949).
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
with respect to these policies. The amendment further provided
that when the insured fails to designate a beneficiary or the bene-
ficiary does not survive the insured or dies before all the payments
become due, the proceeds shall then be payable to the estate of the
insured or of the beneficiary, depending upon the policy termsY
If the beneficiary was entitled to a lump-sum payment but elected
to take under some other form of settlement and died before re-
ceiving all of the payments under that settlement, then the balance
is payable to the estate of the beneficiary; but where a lump-sum
payment is not involved proceeds go to the estate of the insured.10
Neither the insured's estate nor that of the beneficiary takes if
the property would thereby escheat."
Policies matured before August 1, 194612 continue to be sub-
ject to the earlier provisions limiting the class of beneficiaries that
may be designated.1 3 Among the permitted beneficiaries are "par-
ents," which include "persons who have stood in loco parentis to
a member of the military or naval forces at any time prior to entry
into active service for a period of not less than one year, and a
stepparent, if designated as beneficiary by the insured."' 4 If the
beneficiary is undesignated or does not survive the insured or the
beneficiary dies before all of the installments have been paid,
then the insurance is payable under a prescribed order of widow
or widower, children, parents, and brothers or sisters.' Thus the
problem of loco parentis may still arise where a contingent bene-
ficiary takes upon the death of a principal beneficiary, or where
the unpaid amount is awarded according to the above table of
priority.' 6
II. DEFINITION OF Loco PARENTIS AND POLICY
CONSMDERATIONS
Literally the term "loco parentis" signifies an individual stand-
ing in the place of a parent..7 The common law meaning encom-
9. 60 Stat 786 (1946), 38 U. S. C. § 802(u) (1946).
10. Ibid. See 2 Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice § 1143 (Supp.
1950).
11. 60 Stat. 786 (1946), 38 U. S. C. § 802(u) (1946).
12. It should be noted that the period of heaviest combat and the great-
est number of service mortalities occurred prior to this date.
13. 54 Stat. 1010 (1940), as amended, 38 U. S. C. § 802(g) (1946).
14. 56 Stat. 659 (1942), as amended, 38 U. S. C. § 801(f) (1946).
15. 54 Stat. 1010 (1940), as amended, 38 U. S. C. § 802 (1946).
16. See, e.g., Strunk v. United States, 80 F. Supp. 432 (E.D. Ky.
1948) ; Dodd v. United States, 76 F. Supp. 991 (W.D. Ark. 1948).
17. See Thomas v. United States, 189 F. 2d 494, 497 (6th Cir. 1951).
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passes two concepts: the assumption of the parential status,18
and the discharge of parental duties.10 This relationship has been
likened to an adoption without compliance with the necessary
legal formalities.2 0
Desiring to carry out the wishes of deceased servicemen, many
courts approve a liberal interpretation of the term "in loco parentis"
where a beneficiary is designated,2'- but numerous others require
a strict application of common law rules.22 Courts are less eager
to find this status when the claimant seeks recovery under the
succession of payments section governing benefits subsequent to
the death of the designated beneficiary. 23 When faced with the
loco parentis problem, it is quite natural that the courts should
consider the possible application of the strict common law rules.
But since these rules were developed in determining such prob-
lems as the right of a parent to the services of a child,24 or the
privilege of an individual standing in the position of parent to
administer punishment to a child,25 it is doubtful whether they
should be applied to the determination of what constitutes a loco
parentis relationship in life insurance cases, inasmuch as the
considerations involved are obviously different.
Requiring certain basic elements for the finding of a loco parentis
relationship is generally desirable, and mere attachment by the
insured of the label "loco parentis" to a designated beneficiary
should not be sufficient.26 Yet, perhaps, rigidity of standards and
18. Niewiadomski v. United States, 159 F. 2d 683 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 331 U. S. 850 (1947) ; 13 U. of Detroit L. J. 52 (1949).
19. Ibid. Mansfield v. Hester, 81 F. Supp. 772, 775 (S.D. W. Va.
1949).
20. See Newiadomski v. United States, sltpra note 18, at 686; 27
B. U. L. Rev. 338 (1947) ; 25 Chi-Kent Rev. 150 (1947).
21. Richards v. United States, 93 F. Supp. 208 (N.D. W. Va. 1950);
Jadin v. United States, 74 F. Supp. 589 (E.D. Wis. 1947); Baldwin v.
United States, 68 F. Supp. 657 (W.D. Mo. 1946); see United States v.
Zazove, 334 U. S. 602, 610 (1948) (favoring a liberal construction of the
act as to payments in general); Meisner v. United States, 295 Fed. 866
(W.D. 'Mo. 1924) (var risk insurance).
22. United States v. McMaster, 174 F. 2d 257 (5th Cir. 1949) ; Leyerly
v. United States, 162 F. 2d 79 (10th Cir. 1947) ; Niewiadomski v. United
States, 159 F. 2d 683 (6th Cir.) ; cert. denied, 331 U. S. 850 (1947) ; Powl-
edge v. United States, 88 F. Supp. 561 (N.D. Ga. 1950); Mansfield v.
Hester, 81 F. Supp. 772 (S.D. W. Va. 1949) ; Maldonado v. United States,
69 F. Supp. 302 (E.D. N.Y. 1946).
23. See Bearhart v. United States, 82 F. Supp. 652, 656 (D. Minn.
1949); Mansfield v. Hester, 81 F. Supp. 772, 775 (S.D. W. Va. 1949);
Bourbeau v. United States, 76 F. Supp. 778, 781 (D. Me. 1948).
24. Long, Domestic Relations § 262 (2d ed. 1913).
25. Prosser, Torts § 27 (1941).
26. See Maldonado v. United States, 69 F. Supp. 302, 303 (E.D. N.Y.
1946).
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mechanical applications of these criteria should be tempered by
a desire to give effect to the expressed intentions of the deceased
serviceman whenever feasible, insofar as he designated a principal
or contingent beneficiary. Decidedly more difficult are the cases
of claimants in loco parentis seeking unpaid benefits subsequent
to the death of named beneficiaries, and stricter adherence to com-
mon law standards is more justifiable in deciding these cases.
Individual cases are decided on the basis of the court's ap-
praisal of the relationship and. intentions of the insured and the
claimant as evidenced by their actions and declarations. 27 The
remaining sections of this Note deal with factual evidence con-
sidered by the courts and special problems that may arise.
III. AGE OF THE INSURED
Courts have split on the question whether the relationship of
loco parentis can arise where the insured is not a minor."-" Where
the insured is mentally or physically incapacitated at the time the
relationship allegedly arose, it would seem that the loco parentis
relationship may exist even though the insured was an adult."'
Even assuming that the relationship may not arise after minority,
if started earlier it may continue after the insured reaches his
majority.30 The Veteran's Administration has followed a consistent
policy of refusing to find a relationship of loco parentis which is
claimed to have arisen after the insured was no longer a minor;3
however, they do not require that such relationship exist for a
full year during the insured's minority but only that the inception
of the status occur during minority.32 Irrespective of state law
on the matter, the Veteran's Administration considers age twenty-
one as the end of minority for insurance purposes as to both male
and female veterans.83
27. Richards v. United States, 93 F. Supp. 208 (N.D. W. Va. 1950).
28. Holding that minority is rot a requisite: Thomas v. United States,
189 F. 2d 494 (6th Cir. 1951) ; Zazove v. United States, 156 F. 2d 24 (7th
Cir. 1946) ; Meisner v. United States, 295 Fed. 866 (W.D. Mo. 1924) (war
risk insurance). Contra: United States v. McMaster, 174 F. 2d 257 (5th
Cir. 1949) ; Powledge v. United States, 88 F. Supp. 561 (N.D. Ga. 1950);
Howard v. United States, 2 F. 2d 170 (E.D. Ky. 1924); see Bland v.
United States, 185 F. 2d 395-396 (5th Cir. 1950).
29. Horsman v. United States, 68 F. Supp. 522 (W.D. Mo. 1946); see
Richards v. United States, 93 F. Supp. 208, 213 (N.D. W. Va. 1950) :ee
13 U. of Detroit L. J. 52 (1949).
30. Bland v. United States, 185 F. 2d 395 (5th Cir. 1950) ; Leyerly v.
United States, 162 F. 2d 79 (10th Cir. 1947) ; see Richards v. United States,
93 F. Supp. 208, 213 (N.D. W. Va. 1950).
31. Vet's Admin. Dec. No. 536 (1943) ; 25 Chi-Kent Rev. 150 (1947).
32. Vet's Admin. Dec. No. 675 (1945).
33. Vet's Admin. Dec. No. 793 (1948).
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The respective ages of the several parties is another considera-
tion, and one court was greatly influenced in finding a brother-
sister rather than parent-child relationship where the age span
between claimant and insured was only a few months. 34
Perhaps the most satisfactory approach would be closer scrutiny
of the relationship in cases where it allegedly arose after the service-
man reached the age of twenty-one, particularly where the award
to such claimants would thereby exclude natural parents or others
who have stood in such a relationship to the insured for long periods
prior to the time he lived with the claimants.
IV. EcoNomic FACTORS
Traditionally the courts have viewed the assumption of parental
obligations and responsibilities as an element of the loco parentis
relation,35 and certainly support of the insured by the claimant is
a significant factor in deciding these cases, 36 although one court
has contended that the duty of providing for another is not a re-
quisite for loco parentis.-
Support is to be distinguished from merely providing needed
assistance to a relative even for an indefinite period of time,38 and
when the father supports the child by reason of a court order, the
significance of that support is substantially minimized for purposes
of loco parentis. 39 In ascertaining the extent to which the claimant
assumed the responsibilities for supporting the serviceman, the
courts have properly laid heavy emphasis upon the basic essentials
such as food, 0 clothing,41 and shelter, 2 as well as considered
34. See Niewiadomski v. United States, 159 F. 2d 683, 686 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 331 U. S. 850 (1947).
35. Richards v. United States, 93 F. Supp. 208 (N.D. W. Va. 1950);
Baldwin v. United States, 68 F. Supp. 657 (W.D. Mo. 1946); 13 U. of
Detroit L. j. 52 (1949).
36. See United States v. Henning, 191 F. 2d 588, 589 (1st Cir. 1951)
cert. granted, 72 Sup. Ct. 365 (1952) ; Leyerly v. United States, 162 F. 26
79, 86 (10th Cir. 1947) ; Niewiadomski v. United States, 159 F. 2d 683, 684(6th Cir.), cert. denied. 331 U. S. 850 (1947) ; O'Brien v. United States, 84
F. Supp. 531 (D. N.J. 1949).
37. See Thomas v. United States, 189 F. 2d 494, 503 (6th Cir. 1951).
38. See Niewiadomski v. United States, 159 F. 2d 683, 686 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 331 U. S. 850 (1947).
39. United States v. Kwasniewski, 91 F. Supp. 847 (E.D. Mich. 1950).
40. See, e.g., United States v. Henning, 191 F. 2d 588, 590 (1st Cir.
1951), cert. granted, 72 Sup. Ct. 365 (1952) ; Mansfield v. Hester, 81 F.
Supp. 772, 774 (S.D.W. Va. 1949).
41. See, e.g., Golden v. United States, 91 F. Supp. 950, 952 (M.D.
Ala. 1950) ; Derrell v. United States, 82 F. Supp. 18, 24 (E.D. Mo. 1949).
42. See, e.g., United States v. McMaster, 174 F. 2d 257, 259 (5th Cir.
1949) ; Lorden v. United States, 83 F. Supp. 822, 823 (D. Mass. 1949).
1952]
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whether spending money was provided.4 3 Self-support and inde-
pendence of action have been characterized as refuting parental
control and responsibility,44 although the insured's subsequent at-
tainment of a self-supporting status after an earlier dependent rela-
tionship may not be within this prohibition.45
Strauss v. United States4" presented the problem of whether
the loco parentis relationship might arise in spite of welfare pay-
ments to the claimant for supporting the child. In that case the court
found that weekly payments by a welfare society of six or seven
dollars to the claimant negatived the existence of a loco parentis
relationship as against the claim of the serviceman's father, who
had been suffering from poor health. In a subsequent district court
case, however, monthly payments to claimants of nineteen to twenty-
two dollars for the care of Indian children did not prevent the
relationship from arising, where the father had deserted the chil-
dren and the natural mother showed no interest in them.47 Appar-
ently present in the latter case was a growing sense of affection
arising out of what started to be a primarily business arrangement.
A specific agreement between the boy and the claimants that he is
to live with them and be treated as their son may be the basis for
a finding of loco parentis in spite of welfare payments.48 A Massa-
chusetts federal district court distinguished the Strauss case, say-
ing that the Strauss case involved only boarding of the boy, but
that the case before them included education, housing, parental
guidance, and treatment of the boy as a son, in addition to the ele-
ment of welfare board assistance. 49 Thus, while the payment of
welfare assistance often indicates a lack of the parental under-
taking of responsibility to support children, it may, nevertheless,
in some circumstances be consistent with the relation of parent
and child.
Closely related to state welfare support of the child is the factor
whether the insured himself provided for his support by payment of
room and board. The courts have noted whether the insured paid
43. See Horsman v. United States, 68 F. Supp. 522, 523 (W.D. Mo.
1946) ; Meisner v. United States, 295 Fed. 866, 867 (W.D. Mo. 1924).
44. See Richards v. United States, 93 F. Supp. 208, 213 (N.D. W. Va.
1950).
45. See Burke v. United States, 85 F. Supp. 93, 97 (E.D. Pa. 1948).
aff'd 176 F. 438 (3d Cir. 1949).
46. 160 F. 2d 1017 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U. S. 850 (1947).
47. Jadin v. United States, 74 F. Supp. 589 (E.D. Wis. 1947).
48. Jensen v. United States, 78 F. Supp. 974 (D. Me. 1948).
49. Lorden v. United States, 83 F. Supp. 822 (D. Mass. 1949).
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board,50 whether it was paid for him by a parent,51 or whether
he worked to obtain room and board.5 2 Generally speaking, pay-
ment for board and lodging is inconsistent with the relationship of
loco parentis.5 3 On the other hand, performance of, certain services
for the insured while he was living with the claimants is considered
indicative of the existence of loco parentis. For example, the courts
have noticed whether the claimants washed5 4 or mended s the serv-
iceman's clothing, provided medical care, 6 or nursed him through
illness.5
7
V. PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS
The courts consider not only economic relations and elements
but psychological factors as well, that is, the intentions and atti-
tudes of the insured and the claimants.58 Informal agreements be-
tween the serviceman and claimants providing for the care of the
insured during his youth are considered and analyzed.5 9 While
one court stated that either a formal or informal adoption is a re-
quisite of loco parentis,60 apparently a definite agreement is not
necessary for the relationship.6 , Claimant's consideration of legal
adoption of the insured which claimant drops because of fear of
red tape may also be noted as indicating a loco parentis relation-
ship.
62
50. See Niewiadomski v. United States, 159 F. 2d 683, 684 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 331 U. S. 850 (1947).
51. See Bourbeau v. United States, 76 F. Supp. 778, 780 (D. Me.
1948).
52. See Richards v. United States, 93 F. Supp. 208, 213 (N.D. W. Va.
1950).
53. See Maldonado v. United States, 69 F. Supp. 302, 304 (E.D. N.Y.
1946).
54. See United States v. Henning, 191 F. 2d 588, 590 (1st Cir. 1951),
cert. granted, 72 Sup. Ct. 365 (1952); Thomas v. United States, 189 F.
2d 494, 497 (6th Cir. 1951); Mansfield v. Hester, 81 F. Supp. 772, 774(S.D. W. Va. 1949); Baldwin v. United States, 68 F. Supp. 657, 659(W.D. Mo. 1946).
55. See Thomas v. United States, 189 F. 2d 494, 497 (6th Cir. 1951);
Burke v. United States, 85 F. Supp. 93, 95 (E.D. Pa. 1948), aff'd, 176 F. 2d
438 (3d Cir. 1949).
56. See Wood v. United States, 74 F. Supp. 732, 734 (W.D. S.C.
1947) ; Tudor v. United States, 36 F. 2d 386, 388 (W.D. Wash. 1929) (var
risk insurance).
57. See Thomas v. United States, 189 F. 2d 494, 497 (6th Cir. 1951);
Bourbeau v. United States, 76 F. Supp. 778, 780 (D. Ie. 1948).
58. See notes 21 and 22 supra.
59. See Jensen v. United States, 78 F. Supp. 974, 976 (D. Me. 1948);
Wood v. United States, 74 F. Supp. 732, 733 (N.D. S.C. 1947).60. See Powledge v. United States, 88 F. Supp. 561, 564 (N.D. Ga
1950).
61. See Thomas v. United States, 189 F. 2d 494, 505 (6th Cir. 1951).
62. See Golden v. United States, 91 F. Supp. 950, 953 (M.D. Ala.
1950).
19521
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Estrangement between the insured and his former parents is
significant in measuring the type of relationship between insured
and the claimants who say they were his last parents. 3 In one recent
case estrangement was exemplified by a law suit between the in-
sured and his natural father,0 4 while estrangement in another case
resulted from the marriage of the insured's mother to one of his
friends after the death of the insured's natural father. 2 The courts
have tried to ascertain whether the degree of affection between
claimant and insured is comparable to the customary affection of
parents for their children.6 Kindness and generosity alone are not
sufficient,67 and absent other factors even a strong bond of affec-
tion may not be enough.
68
Several courts regard it significant that the insured's designa-
tion of beneficiary was made without coercion and that claimant's
prior acts had been performed without the hope of gain. 8 Insured's
explanation to others of his reasons for naming the claimants as
beneficiaries is relevant.7 0
With whom the insured lived for various portions of his life is
frequently considered by the courts7 1 and was extensively relied
upon by at least one tribunal.7 2 The fact that insured lived with
someone other than the claimant for long periods of time indicates
an absence of a loco parentis relationship,73 although this fact may
not be determinative when the claimant's absence is necessitated by
63. See Jadin v. United States, 74 F. Supp. 589, 591 (E.D. Wis. 1947)
(desertion by father and lack of interest by mother).
64. See Baumet v. United States, 191 F. 2d 194, 195 (2d Cir. 1951).
65. See Golden v. United States, 91 F. Supp. 950, 951 (M.D. Ala.
1950).
66. See United States v. Henning, 191 F. 2d 588, 589 (1st Cir. 1951),
cert. granted, 72 Sup. Ct. 365 (1952) ; Golden v. United States, 91 F. Supp.
950, 952 (M.D. Ala. 1950) ; Baldwin v. United States, 68 F. Supp. 657, 662
(W.D. Mo. 1946).
67. See Richards v. United States, 93 F. Supp. 208, 213 (N.D. W. Va.
1950).
68. Strauss v. United States, 160 F. 2d 1017 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
331 U. S. 850 (1947).
69. See Wood v. United States, 74 F. Supp. 732, 735 (W.D. S.C. 1947)
(lack of coercion) ; Horsman v. United States, 68 F. Supp. 522, 525 (W.D.
Mo. 1946).
70. See Baldwin v. United States, 68 F. Supp. 657, 660 (W.D. Mo.
1946).
71. See United States v. Henning, 191 F. 2d 588, 590 (1st Cir. 1951),
cert. granted, 72 Sup. Ct. 365 (1952) ; Strunk v. United States, 80 F. Supp.
432, 434 (E.D. Ky. 1948) ; Bourbeau v. United States, 76 F. Supp. 778, 780
(D. Me. 1948).
72. See Neuhard v. United States, 83 F. Supp. 911, 913 (M.D. Pa.
1949).
73. See Maldonado v. United States, 69 F. Supp. 302, 304 (E.D. Ky.
1946).
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work elsewhere to obtain income needed to support the insured.7 4
Greater importance should be attached to the general tenor of
the relationship within the home. Courts notice whether the parties
treat each other as members of the family"5 and specifically whether
insured is treated like a son by the claimants" and like a brother
by the other children of the claimants. 77 That claimant considered
insured as a brother and not a child is detrimental to her claim of
standing in loco parentis. 78
The manner by which the insured and claimants refer to each
other is significant, as where the claimant calls insured "son" and
he calls her "mom. ' 7 Calling his stepfather "dad" was noted by one
court,", but the fact that claimant does not refer to insured as her
"son" does not prvent the loco parentis relationship from arising.81
Closely related to this criterion is the examination of letters from
the insured to claimant to determine whether they contain the nor-
mal amount of affection.8 2 One court looked at the contents of a
telegram," while others noted the heading and closing of letters8 4
for indications of the relationship.
Education of the boy and general responsibility for his school-
ing are indicative of parental responsibilities."5 Similarly, sending
him to church may help establish the claimant's assumed respon-
sibility in the moral and spiritual education of the child.86 Closely
74. See Derrell v. United States, 82 F. Supp. 18, 23 (E.D. Mo. 1949).
75. See Thomas v. United States, 189 F. 2d 494, 496 (6th Cir. 1951).
76. See Lorden v. United States, 83 F. Supp. 822, 823 (D. Mass.
1949) ; Horsman v. United States, 68 F. Supp. 522, 524 (W.D. Mo. 1946)
Meisner v. United States, 295 Fed. 866, 867 (W.D. Mo. 1924) (war risk
insurance).
77. See Bearhart v. United States, 82 F. Supp. 652, 656 (D. Minn.
1949).
78. See Niewiadomski v. United States, 159 F. 2d 683, 685 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 331 U. S. 850 (1947).
79. See Derrell v. United States, 82 F. Supp. 18, 24 (E.D. Mo. 1949).
80. See United States v. Kwasniewski, 91 F. Supp. 847, 850 (E.D.
Mich. 1950).
81. See United States v. Henning, 191 F. 2d 588, 590 (1st Cir. 1951),
cert. granted, 72 Sup. Ct. 365 (1952).
82. See Mansfield v. Hester, 81 F. Supp. 772, 774 (S.D. W. Va. 1949);
Bourbeau v. United States, 76 F. Supp. 778, 780 (D. Me. 1948) ; Wood v.
United States, 74 F. Supp. 732, 734 (W.D. S.C. 1947); Horsman v.
United States, 68 F. Supp. 522, 524 (W.D. Mo. 1946).
83. See Thomas v. United States, 189 F. 2d 494, 496 (6th Cir. 1951).
84. See Burke v. United States, 85 F. Supp. 93, 96 (E.D. Pa. 1948),
af'd. 176 F. 2d 438 (3d Cir. 1949) ; Jensen v. United States, 78 F. Supp. 974,
977 (D. Me. 1948) ; Baldwin v. United States, 68 F. Supp. 657, 660 (W.D.
Mo. 1946).
85. See Burke v. United States, 85 F. Supp. 93, 95 (E.D. Pa. 1948),
afr'd. 176 F. 2d 438 (3d Cir. 1949) ; Lorden v. United States, 83 F. Supp. 822,
823 (D. Mass. 1949).
86. See Burke v. United States, supra note 85.
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related to education of the insured are matters of parental guid-
ance8 7 and supervision,"" both of which constitute crucial element,
in the psychological relationship.
In general, it may be said that psychological factors are of equal
significance with economic factors in the determination of the type
of relationship and whether it measures up to the requirements of
loco parentis. The best reasoned decisions are based on a careful
analysis of all factors, including economic and psychological.
VI. RELATIONSHIP OF THE PARTIES
Presence of the claim on behalf of natural parents naturally im-
pedes the claim of persons seeking to recover insurance on the
basis of loco parentis, and death of natural parents is noted by the
courts.8 9 Rights asserted by one natural parent may be weakened
when the other natural parent supports the claimant in loco par-
entis.90 One court stated that a person who stands in loco parentis
to the insured for one year before the insured enters the service
takes precedence over natural parents not named as beneficiaries."1
Several judges have suggestec that the right of natural parents is
revived after any superseding status between insured and a grand-
parent has been terminated by the death of the grandparents." In
a rather broad statement one court enunciated the questionable rule
that the parental status continues regardless of support, discipline.
or desertion of the child by the parent.9 3 Although the existence of a
natural parent constitutes an obstacle to sustaining a claim on the
basis of loco parentis, it does not prevent recovery. 94
87. See Lordenv. United States, 83 F. Supp. 822, 823 (D. Mass. 1949).
88. See Burke v. United States, 85 F. Supp. 93, 95 (E.D. Pa. 1948).
aff'd, 176 F. 2d 438 (3d Cir. 1949) ; Gibbs v. United States, 80 F. Supp. 907.
908 (E.D. N.C. 1948). Supervision of claimant was subject to general
supervision of grandparent in McDonald v. United States, 91 F. Supp. 163.
167 (D. Mass. 1950).
89. See Thomas v. United States, 189 F. 2d 494, 496 (6th Cir. 1951):
United States v. Niewiadomski, 159 F. 2d 683, 684 (6th Cir.), cert. deied.
331 U. S. 850 (1947).
90. See Baldwin v. United States, 68 F. Supp. 657, 658 (WN.D. Mo.
1946) ; see Leyerly v. United States, 162 F. 2d 79, 85 (10th Cir. 1947) (hy
implication).
91. See Burke v. United States, 85 F. Supp. 93, 97 (E.D. Pa. 1948),
aff'd. 176 F. 2d 438 (3d Cir. 1949).
92. See Mansfield v. Hester, 81 F. Supp. 772, 776 (S.D. W. Va. 1949)
Strunk v. United States, 80 F. Supp. 432, 435 (E.D. Ky. 1948).
93. See Henning v. United States, 93 F. Supp. 380, 382 (D. Mass.
1950), rezd on other grounds, 191 F. 2d 588 (1st Cir. 1951), cert. granted.
72 Sup. Ct. 365 (1952).
94. See Bland v. United State , 185 F. 2d 395 (5th Cir. 1950) (aunt)
McClendon v. United States, 163 R 2d 895 (7th Cir. 1947) (aunt) ; Golden
v. United States, 91 F. Supp. 950 (M.D. Ala. 1950) (guardian) ; Jensen v.
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NOTES
Courts consider whether claimant and insured are blood rela-
tives, 2 but the absence of consanguinty does not necessarily pre-
vent the loco parentis relationship."" The great stress laid upon
the existence of blood ties has been sharply criticized, 91 and while
too much emphasis undoubtedly can be placed upon this factor, it
may be well to consider it as part of the total picture. Stepparents
may be designated as beneficiaries, but unless they are so designated
their claims must be presented as falling within the definition of
parent which includes father or mother by adoption or persons
standing in the relation of loco parentis. 9s
Two recent court of appeals decisions 0 reached conflicting con-
clusions on the unique question of whether an insured may have
more than one material and one parternal parent for purposes of
loco parentis. An earlier district court case stated that there could
be only one parent of each sex for these purposes. 00 However, a
later decision indicated the possibility of two women standing in
loco parentis to a boy, saying that the second woman if acting
as the bread-winner might perform the duties of a father and be
fictitiously charged with the father's rights, duties, and responsi-
bilities."'0 By regulation the Veteran's Administration has ruled
that only one father and one mother may be recognized in a particu-
lar case. 10 2 In applying this regulation the Veteran's Administration
held the while it was possible to have two parents of one sex succes-
sively, it was not possible to have two parents of the same sex con-
temporaneously. 0 3 While the Second Circuit in Baurnet v. United
States'" cited and applied this regulation, the First Circuit in
United States, 78 F. Supp. 974 (D. Me. 1948) (foster parent). But see
Bearhart v. United States, 82 F. Supp. 652, 655 (D. Minn. 1949) (aunt);
Mansfield v. Hester, 81 F. Supp. 772, 773 (S.D. W. Va. 1949) (aunt).
95. See United States v. McMaster, 174 F. 2d 257, 259 (5th Cir. 1949)(father and third-party claimants).
96. See Jensen v. United States, 78 F. Supp. 974, 975 (D. Me. 1948)(natural parents apparently indicated very little interest in child).
97. 25 Chi-Kent Rev. 150, 153 (1947).
98. See Dodd v. United States, 76 F. Supp. 991, 994 (W.D- Ark.
1948).
99. Compare United States v. Henning, 191 F. 2d 588 (1st Cir. 1951),
cert. granted, 72 Sup. Ct. 365 (1952), with Baumet v. United States, 191
F. 2d 194 (2d Cir. 1951).
100. See Mansfield v. Hester, 81 F. Supp. 772, 775-776 (S.D. W. Va
1949).
101. Reynolds v. United States, 96 F. Supp. 257 (D. Kan. 1951) (alter-
native holding).
102. Vet's Admin. Reg. No. 10, para. 7, as amended 57 Stat. 556 (1943)
38 U. S. C. A. § 257 (Supp. 1951).
103. Vet's Admin. Dec. No. 792 (1948).
104. 191 F. 2d 194 (2d Cir. 1951).
19521
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
United States v. Henning,10 5 reached a contrary decision on this
point. In light of the regulation it is difficult to rationalize the con-
clusion reached by the court in the Henning case; yet the merits
of the rule itself may be open to some question in those exceptional
cases where several persons of the same sex jointly undertake
to care for the insured during his youth.
VII. CONCLUSION
Various grounds have been relied upon by the courts in reaching
their decision as to whether a claimant stands in loco parentis, and
seldom is one factor so conclusive as to warrant ignoring the other
elements of the case. Moreover, often the factors do not all point
toward one result, and in those cases a sound balancing of considera-
tions is needed. First, the court in all fairness to parties must
evaluate the proffered evidence as to the weight that it warrants.
Mechanical application of these factors and a mere totaling up of
the number of elements on each side is unwise and often leads to
undersirable results. Common sense application of these factors
should be made in the light of the Congressional policy of limiting
the insured's power to designate beneficiaries. A viewpoint some-
what more liberal than the strict common law approach would be
warranted by the nature of the subject and those for whose benefit
the policies were set up.
105. 191 F. 2d 588 (1st Cir. 1951), cert. granted, 72 Sup. Ct. 365
(1952).
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